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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mexican State has not managed to reduce the problem of 
corruption in the country. After two decades of policies without vis-
ible outcomes, Enrique Peña Nieto’s Government prompted the cre-
ation of the National Anti-Corruption System (Sistema Nacional An-
ticorrupción, hereinafter SNA). The legal reforms to create this new 
system, hailed as the ultimate solution to overcome the problem, be-
gan in 2015. Three years later, close to the ending of Peña Nieto’s 
period, the system has not been put into full operation. This omis-
sion is due to the lack of consensus among the government, the leg-
islature, and civil society. 
The creation of an anti-corruption agency, such as the SNA, re-
sponded to international organizations’ recommendations. Also, 
Mexican civil society groups gave significant support to the pro-
posal. For these reasons, the incoming government should consider 
the convenience of giving continuity to this agency. Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador comes to Presidency with considerable political sup-
port, which will let him achieve the political consensus required to 
complete the SNA’s implementation. The next government’s grand 
challenge will be to overcome the previous Mexican reformers’ 
fault, which has been to assume that the creation of institutions is 
the only goal, without worrying about providing the necessary re-
sources to get results. 
In this transition context, this article reviews the Mexican SNA’s 
principal characteristics and discusses its foreseeable future. Section 
II briefly describes the serious panorama of corruption that led to the 
creation of the SNA. This article refers to examples of the types of 
corruption that have been identified in recent times in the country, 
among others: great political corruption; small bureaucratic corrup-
tion; and corruption in both the criminal justice system and in the 
police force, which in some cases has been captured by the orga-
nized crime. 
The following section reviews the SNA’s creation process. The 
agency’s legal framework consists of seven laws enacted in 2016 
that develops the constitutional reforms promulgated in 2014 and 
2015. The main objective of this legal and institutional framework 
is to bring together anti-corruption related institutions in a central 
coordination committee. Four anti-corruption institutions run the 
main branches of the SNA: internal control of the administration; 
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auditing process; investigation; prosecution; and sanction of admin-
istrative responsibilities as well as criminal. 
Section IV discusses the SNA’s immediate future with the in-
coming government on the horizon. Some of the reforms that may 
be promoted by López Obrador’s administration, according to the 
public agenda of its party, the National Regeneration Movement 
(Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, hereinafter MORENA), are 
mentioned. This paper also highlights some legislative measures 
that the next government should carry out to fulfill the implementa-
tion of international conventions against corruption, which Mexico 
signed. 
The article argues the SNA should not be considered the ultimate 
solution to Mexico’s corruption problem. Most likely, the agency 
will not give results if its job is unaccompanied by policies promot-
ing a cultural shift in the country. The current organizational culture, 
which allows corruption practices both in public and private fields, 
should be replaced by a culture based on integrity and values. Also, 
a culture of denouncement and punishment of corrupt practices 
should replace the customary impunity. 
II. CORRUPTION’S PICTURE IN RECENT MEXICO 
Corruption has been a hot topic in Mexico’s recent history with 
great media coverage.1 The beginning of the 21st century was mark-
edly bad for Mexican society in this matter because the hopes of 
change generated by the rotation of political power never material-
ized. In 2000, society believed that the defeat of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, herein-
after PRI) and the National Action Party’s (Partido Acción 
Nacional, hereinafter PAN) arrival to power would transform the 
conditions that allowed corruption and impunity. Before long, the 
new administration disappointed society because the expected insti-
tutional transformation never happened.2 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Acerca de la calificación moral de la corrup-
ción: Tan solo una propuesta, 21 ISONOMÍA 9, 16 (2004) (stating that political 
corruption in democratic systems “is in vogue” because the amount of journalistic 
writings and TV programs on this issue is immense). 
 2 See Mathieu Tromme & Miguel Angel Lara Otaola, Enrique Peña Nieto’s 
National Anti Corruption Commission and the Challenges of Waging War against 
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Corruption, instead of decreasing, increased during the last three 
presidential periods. Continual “soap-opera-like scandals”3 revealed 
“grand corruption”4 cases, one after another. Presidents themselves 
were involved in accusations of corruption related to the granting of 
multimillionaire public contracts, such as the Fox issue and Ocean-
ografía,5 Calderón and the Odebrecht case,6 and Peña Nieto’s white 
house.7 The situation was similar on the local government level. In 
recent years, at least 42 former governors were mentioned by the 
press as suspects of acts of corruption.8 Only 17 were officially in-
vestigated.9 
                                                                                                             
Corruption in Mexico, 30 MEXICAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS MEXICANOS 557, 561 
(2014) (“[T]he transition from PRI to PAN in many ways has continued the status 
quo. Instead of taking the opportunity to truly change the democratic foundations 
and to eradicate opportunities for clientelism, politics remains highly personal-
ized.”). 
 3 Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and Mexican Political Culture, 45 
JOURNAL OF THE SOUTHWEST 671, 671 (2003). 
 4 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform 
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 444, 2012) (stating that the “grand 
corruption” involves “high-level officials” involved on the granting of large pub-
lic contracts); see also CASAR, MÉXICO: ANATOMÍA DE LA CORRUPCIÓN 32 (2015) 
(stating that grand corruption occurs in the higher political stairs). 
 5 See J. Jesús Esquivel, El enriquecimiento de Oceanografía (y de los her-
manos Bribiesca), bajo investigación, PROCESO (Nov. 23, 2013), formato HTML, 
https://www.proceso.com.mx/358940/el-enriquecimiento-de-oceanografia-y-de-
los-hermanos-bribiesca-bajo-investigacion-2. 
 6 See Jesusa Cervantes, Caso Odebrecht: Los escandalosos silencios de Fe-
lipe Calderón, PROCESO (Nov. 4, 2017), formato HTML, https://www.pro-
ceso.com.mx/509851/caso-odebrecht-los-escandalosos-silencios-felipe-calde-
ron. 
 7 In 2014, a journalistic investigation revealed that President Peña Nieto has 
a 7-million-dollar residence in Mexico City. This mansion was built to President’s 
wife liking by Grupo Higa, a construction company that earned millions in the 
State of Mexico when Peña Nieto was governor. See La casa blanca de Enrique 
Peña Nieto (investigación especial), ARISTEGUI NOTICIAS (Nov. 9, 2014), 
https://aristeguinoticias.com/0911/mexico/la-casa-blanca-de-enrique-pena-
nieto/. 
 8 Elisabeth Malkin, En México se acumulan los gobernadores corruptos, e 
impunes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/es/2017/04/19/mexico-gobernadores-corrupcion-impunidad-duarte/. 
 9 Id. 
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Since 2000, documented cases of political corruption have in-
cluded bribes and kickback payments from both national and for-
eign10 companies to medium-high level public officials for the 
awarding of public contracts.11 This generalized practice has be-
come one of the “vices”12 in the procurement and bidding for public 
works. Another usual form of corruption has been embezzlement, 
which occurs through diversion of public funds to ghost companies’ 
networks. The recently discovered “master scam”13 is an example of 
this large-scale treasury diversion. 
The request of unlawful payments in exchange for granting of 
permits and administrative licenses has been an ordinary “petty cor-
ruption” practice.14 Bribery has turned into a “standardized” activity 
for many companies that have included it within their daily opera-
tion processes.15 For professionals who negotiate legal matters with 
the administration,16 corruption has been inevitable too. The same is 
                                                                                                             
 10 Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2 (referring that some U.S. companies 
as Lindsey Manufacturing Co., Wal-Mart and Orthofix International were in-
volved in corruption practices in Mexico). 
 11 See Alejandro Faya Rodríguez, La triste realidad en las contrataciones 
públicas, NEXOS (Dec. 1, 2016), formato HTML, 
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=30458. 
 12 Jorge Fernández Ruiz, Los vicios de la contratación pública en México, 66 
DERECHO PUCP. REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO 469 (2011) (noting that 
public sector contracts award is carried out without rectitude because the vices are 
incubated in the legal regulation itself, which allows corruption). 
 13 See La Estafa maestra. Graduados en desaparecer dinero público, 
ANIMAL POLÍTICO (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.animalpolitico.com/estafa-maes-
tra/ (discussing that during Peña Nieto’s administration, several Federal govern-
ment’s agencies diverted 7 billion pesos (USD 45 million), giving them to 128 
ghost companies through illegal contracts). 
 14 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AT THE SECTOR LEVEL AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 86 (2015) (stating that “petty corruption 
refers to minor payments for services that should have been offered free of charge 
or extra payments for services formally offered at a set price”). 
 15 David Arellano Gault, Corrupción ¿calle de una sola vía? La internaliza-
ción del soborno en empresas en México, 84 IZTAPALAPA. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS 
SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES 163, 163 (2018) (stating that “companies build rou-
tines and internal solutions that allow them to meet the demand of bribery from 
public officials [ . . . ] companies create stable and organized internal processes to 
pay bribes as a normalized act”). 
 16 José C. García González et al., Public Sector Corruption in Mexico: Social 
Representations Among the Legal Community of the Federal District, 37 U. 
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true for counselors that litigate before judicial bodies.17 Day after 
day, citizens have participated in acts of corruption18 either volun-
tarily to obtain undue benefits19 and avoid sanctions or compulso-
rily, when illegal exactions are required in exchange for the provi-
sion of public services.20 
The most serious corruption has occurred inside security and law 
enforcement institutions. Citizens have seen police as a corrupt in-
stitution that, instead of acting against crime, has allowed crime to 
increase.21 Participation of policemen in crimes like extortion22 and 
kidnapping23 has shown the closeness between police forces and 
                                                                                                             
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 231, 258 (2006) (stating that corruption practices are 
habitual in Mexico’s public administration, so “involvement in situations requir-
ing bribery has become unavoidable for the lawyers who want to successfully 
negotiate government matters”). 
 17 See Alberto M. Binder, Corrupción y sistemas judiciales, 10 REFORMA 
JUDICIAL. REVISTA MEXICANA DE JUSTICIA 135, 138 (2007) (referring to the types 
of corruption inside judicial organizations and the participation of lawyers in acts 
of corruption). 
 18 See CASAR, supra note 4, at 33 (citing polls that report the commission of 
more than 4 million annual acts of petty corruption in the contact of citizens with 
the authorities). 
 19 See Bernardo Jiménez & María García, Corrupción y caos urbano en Gua-
dalajara, Jalisco México, in COMO DISMINUIR LA CORRUPCIÓN Y MEJORAR LA 
GOBERNABILIDAD EN PAÍSES DE DESARROLLO 69 (María Ramos et al. eds., 2014) 
(citing evidence of acts of corruption related to the granting of licenses and per-
mits in Guadalajara, which has caused urban chaos in that city). 
 20 See Jassel Córdova Guzmán & Aldo F. Ponce, Los tipos de corrupción y 
la satisfacción con los servicios públicos. Evidencia del caso mexicano, 70 
REGIÓN Y SOCIEDAD 231 (2017) (noting that corruption related to public services 
has a negative impact in the citizens’ satisfaction level with the provision of those 
services). 
 21 See Daniel M. Sabet, Corruption or Insecurity? Understanding Dissatis-
faction with Mexico’s Police, 55 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 22, 24–
7 (2013) (referring to evidence on corrupt police and stating that corruption is seen 
as a “normality in relations between police and citizens”). 
 22 See Alberto Díaz-Cayeros et al., Caught in the Crossfire: The Geography 
of Extortion and Police Corruption in Mexico (Stanford Center for International 
Development Working Paper No. 545, Feb. 2015), https://globalpoverty.stan-
ford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/545wp_0.pdf. 
 23 See Miquel À. Ruiz Torres y Elena Azaola Garrido, Cuadrar el delito. Cor-
rupción institucional y participación de policías en el secuestro en México, 44 
PERFILES LATINOAMERICANOS 91 (2014). 
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criminal groups and institutional reproduction of corruption inside 
police bodies.24 
Acts of corruption by the public prosecutor agents have included 
the request of “gifts” to negotiate the liberation of arrested delin-
quents25 and illicit grabbing of narcotics and other confiscated ob-
jects related to crimes.26 Filling up the picture, the administration of 
justice has not been exempted from the commission of acts of cor-
ruption.27 
The ceaseless rise of organized crime has worsened the conse-
quences of the close relationship between corruption, delinquency, 
and impunity, which was a legacy of 20th century PRI’s regime28 
that following governments could not eliminate. For decades, drug 
cartels have corrupted policemen and politicians29 by “using plata o 
plomo (bribe or bullet) techniques.”30 Facing cartels’ power, officers 
have had two options: to be corrupted or to be killed.31 
Previous governments have failed to cope with the double trou-
ble of corruption and criminality. In a vicious circle, criminal organ-
                                                                                                             
 24 Id. 
 25 See Sánchez, Pablo Guerrero & Álvarez, Luis Pérez, ”México, corrupción 
organizacional institucionalizada: un estudio de caso,” Revista Iberoamericana de 
las Ciencias Sociales y Humanísticas [RICSH], vol. 5, núm. 9, June 2016. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Binder, supra note 17. 
 28 See Louise Shelley, Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the 
Post-PRI Transition, 17 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 213, 
213-14 (2001) (stating that in 2000 President Fox faced the legacy of PRI that 
includes “institutionalized grand corruption and the political-criminal nexus of the 
drug traffickers with the state apparatus”). 
 29 See id.; see also Imtiaz Hussain, Mexico at bay? Corrupt cross-
roads, COMO DISMINUIR LA CORRUPCIÓN Y MEJORAR LA GOBERNABILIDAD EN 
PAÍSES DE DESARROLLO 41, 50 (María Ramos et al. eds., 2014) (stating that by the 
1990s the cartels “penetrated every segment of public life at all levels of policy-
making”). 
 30 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, Organized Crime, and Money Laun-
dering, World Bank Roundtable on Institutions, Governance and Corruption, 
Montevideo, (2016). 
 31 See Justin B. Shapiro, What Are They Smoking?! Mexico’s Decriminaliza-
tion of Small-Scale Drug Possession in the Wake of a Law Enforcement Failure, 
42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 115, 121 (2010) (stating that “those honorable 
officers who wish to maintain order and integrity will almost certainly be mur-
dered by traffickers”). 
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izations have generated more corruption which, in turn, has pro-
moted the proliferation of criminality and an increase in violence.32 
The firm hand strategy, which has been tackling delinquency since 
2000, has produced paradoxical results.33 The greater public force 
deployed by the State has produced more corruption and criminal 
violence,34 rather than neutralize delinquency. 
Scandals of corruption that involve high-level politicians, daily 
citizens’ experience with bureaucratic corruption, and capture of po-
lice by organized crime have progressively darkened Mexico’s cor-
ruption picture. In addition, mass media has spread the idea that cor-
ruption is an uncontrollable “cancer” endangering the nation.35 So-
ciety’s bad perception about the topic reflects this darkened picture. 
Nowadays, corruption is one of the main concerns for Mexicans.36 
It is recognized as a serious and frequent problem, which virtually 
occurs in almost all institutions.37 In parallel, Mexico’s evaluation 
                                                                                                             
 32 See Stephen D. Morris, Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in 
Mexico, 18 THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 29 (2012) (stating that cor-
ruption facilitates the organized crime and at the same time drug trafficking can-
not operate without corruption; also proposing a “paradox”: that corruption once 
coexisted and facilitated peaceful operation of drug trafficking, but now coexists 
and facilitates a more violent crime). 
 33 See Edgardo Buscaglia, La Paradoja Mexicana de la Delincuencia Organ-
izada: Policías, violencia y corrupción, REVISTA POLICÍA Y SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA 
275, 279 (2012) (noting the “paradox” that occurs when the State assigns more 
public force for repression of criminal groups; however, the same criminal groups 
generate more violence and corruption because they are always willing to buy 
officials). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Fernando Gil Villa, Discursos sobre corrupción en México, 5 REV. 
SOCIEDAD & EQUIDAD 259, 261 (2013) (stating that media transmit a “cata-
strophic message”: corruption is so widespread in the social body and is so lethal 
that it threatens democracy and social order). 
 36 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Resultados de la Encuesta 
Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental 2017, formato PDF, 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/ 
boletines/2018/EstSegPub/encig2018_03.pdf (Comunicado de prensa No. 
136/18, Mar. 22, 2018) (stating that in 2017 corruption was the second most wor-
rying problem for Mexicans). 
 37 CASAR, supra note 4, at 19–22 (citing polls that indicate that corruption is 
a serious problem for almost 80% of the citizens and is frequent or very frequent 
for 88%; also noting that the level of perception of corruption is high practically 
in all the analyzed institutions). 
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in the main international assessments, such as World Bank’s Gov-
ernance Indicators38 and Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index,39 has deteriorated in the last two years. 
A part of the population has assumed the belief that corruption 
is a Mexican cultural problem.40 Scholars have investigated the the-
sis of the relationship between Mexican culture and corruption,41 
even suggesting that corruption is “normal”42 inside Mexican cul-
ture.43 Rather than an open approval of corruption, several factors, 
among others, that have favored the spread of corruption to systemic 
levels44 are presented in Mexican society: great citizen distrust in 
                                                                                                             
 38 Mexico’s Percentile Rank in the Control of Corruption Indicator has gone 
down to 23.0769 in 2016, the lowest number since 2000. See Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (last visited Aug. 1, 2018), 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#reports. 
 39 Mexico’s score fell to 29 points in 2017, ranking in 135th place out of 180 
countries. It is the lowest score since 2000. Mexico’s score had remained stable 
during previous years: 3.3 in 2000, at the beginning of Vicente Fox’s term; 3.3 in 
2006, at the beginning of Calderón’s term; and 34 in 2012, at the beginning of 
Peña Nieto’s term. See Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (last visited Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.transparency.org/re-
search/cpi. 
 40 See Arturo Rodríguez García, “Me sostengo” en lo dicho, “la corrupción 
es cultural”: Peña Nieto, PROCESO (Sept. 8, 2014), formato HTML, 
https://www.proceso.com.mx/381646/me-sostengo-en-lo-dicho-la-corrupcion-
es-cultural-pena (explaining that President Peña Nieto himself pointed out that 
corruption is a “cultural issue” in Mexico). 
 41 See Morris, supra note 3, at 676 (stating that “[c]orruption, in many ways, 
is deeply ingrained in the Mexican culture”). 
 42 Hussain, supra note 29, at 44 (stating that “Mexican corruption extends far 
beyond institutional settings into cultural confines, and routine daily activities that 
perpetrators take to be normal when, in fact, they remain part and parcel of what 
constitutes corruption”). 
 43 Contra Issa Luna Pla, La corrupción no es un problema cultural, HECHOS 
Y DERECHOS (Jan. 18, 2018) (stating that corruption is not a cultural problem but 
an educative and judicial problem). 
 44 CASAR, supra note 4, at 22; see also Arellano Gault, supra note 15. 
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the government,45 weak culture of legality,46 institutional deficien-
cies that hinder prosecution and punishment, and wrong organiza-
tional behavior that induces corrupt practices.47 Because of this 
combination of factors,48 corruption in Mexico is not only a matter 
of individuals but a “dense social phenomenon.”49 
III. NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM’S ORIGIN AND 
STRUCTURE 
A. Constitutional and Legal Reform Process 
The fight against corruption has been a hot issue in the Mexican 
governments agenda for several decades.50 Since the 1980s, each 
administration has pushed a big solution for the big problem in a 
succession of “almost-ritualistic anti-corruption campaigns”51 that 
have predominantly been useless.52 Institutional actions have not 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Stephen D. Morris, Mexico’s Political Culture: the Unrule of Law and 
Corruption as a Form of Resistance, 3 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 327 (2011) (stating 
that Mexicans neither trust the law nor its rulers and consider that sometimes 
breaking the law is legitimate). 
 46 CASAR, supra note 4, at 34 (stating that Mexican citizens do not know the 
laws but thinks that disobeying unfair or unfavorable laws is valid); see also Ce-
cilia Güemes, La corrupción y la (des)confianza como normas sociales; Cambio 
de enfoque, nuevas perspectivas, REVISTA INTERNACIONAL TRANSPARENCIA E 
INTEGRIDAD (Jan./Apr. 2018) (noting that people who fall into corruption think 
that others in the same situation would do the same). 
 47 See David Arellano Gault, Corrupción como proceso organizacional: 
comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción, 62 
CONTADURÍA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN 810, 813–14 (2017) (stating that organizations 
normalize practices and behaviors that induce corruption often as an unexpected 
or undesired consequence of the action). 
 48 See Víctor Mauricio Castañeda Rodríguez, Una investigación sobre la cor-
rupción pública y sus determinantes, 227 REVISTA MEXICANA DE CIENCIAS 
POLÍTICAS Y SOCIALES 103 (2016) (noting that corruption is the result of a com-
bination of factors). 
 49 Arellano Gault, supra note 47. 
 50 See Daniel Márquez, Mexican Administrative Law Against Corruption: 
Scope and Future, 8 MEXICAN L. REV. 75, 81–82 (2015); Tromme & Lara Otaola, 
supra note 2, at 561–62; CASAR, supra note 4, at 49–50. 
 51 Morris, supra note 3. 
 52 See Jaime Talancón Martínez & Sofía Ramírez Aguilar, Sistema Nacional 
Anticorrupción: Voluntad política y exigencia ciudadana, NEXOS (Apr. 1, 2017), 
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produced results in the prevention and punishment fields. These fail-
ures have been associated with the “lack of political will”53 of the 
ruling classes, who have avoided confronting the corrupt gangs’ 
power.54 
With that record of failed solutions55 behind him, Enrique Peña 
Nieto proposed his own plan against corruption focusing on two 
central axes: strengthening access to public information and creating 
an independent oversight body named National Anti-Corruption 
Commission.56 The transparency and anti-corruption constitutional 
reform initiatives were presented to the Senate by the PRI’s parlia-
mentary group in September and November 2012, even before Peña 
Nieto took office.57 
During the following two years, the drafts were discussed in the 
legislature along with seven other initiatives presented by opposition 
parties. Also, congressmen heard civil society groups.58 The consti-
tutional reform on transparency was approved and published in 
2014, followed by the constitutional reform on corruption in 2015.59 
                                                                                                             
formato HTML, https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=31917 (stating that anti-corrup-
tion institutions of the last decades have been very expensive for the taxpayers 
and have offered very few results in very long terms). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Márquez, supra note 50, at 75 (stating that Mexican anticorruption 
model “has repeatedly designed administrative rules and structures that are unable 
to rise above the political and social spheres”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 559 (stating that Peña Nieto 
proposed “a) empowering the Federal Institute for the Access to Information and 
Data Protection [ . . . ] b) creating an independent body to oversee the purchase of 
governmental publicity, as well as c) a National Anti-Corruption Commission”). 
 57 Presentan en el Senado iniciativa anticorrupción de EPN, ARISTEGUI 
NOTICIAS (Nov. 15, 2012), formato HTML, https://aristeguinoti-
cias.com/1511/mexico/presentan-en-el-senado-iniciativa-anticorrupcion-de-epn/. 
 58 See María Marván Laborde, Siete leyes y un elefante en la sala, HECHOS Y 
DERECHOS (July 9, 2016), formato HTML, https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/in-
dex.php/hechos-y-derechos/article/view/10549/12714; see also CASAR, supra 
note 4, at 52. 
 59 See generally Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposi-
ciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia 
de transparencia. Proceso legislativo (Feb. 7, 2014), formato PDF http://www.di-
putados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/docleg/62/215_DOF_07feb14.pdf; see also 
Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de 
la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de combate 
a la corrupción. Proceso legislativo (May 27, 2015), formato PDF, 
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These two reforms, which modified around twenty constitutional ar-
ticles, establish the bases of two coordination agencies: the National 
Transparency System (Sistema Nacional de Transparencia, herein-
after SNT) and the SNA. 
The SNT began to work in 2015 after the transparency law was 
enacted.60 The system integrates an autonomous national body in 
charge of policies on transparency, access to information and per-
sonal data protection (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso 
a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, hereinafter 
INAI), and local institutes with reinforced attributes.61 Other insti-
tutions such as the Chief Audit Office of the Federation (Auditoría 
Superior de la Federación, hereinafter ASF), the General Archive 
of the Nation (Archivo General de la Nación), and the National In-
stitute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
y Geografía) are also included.62 The SNT’s objectives are coordi-
nating the elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive pub-
lic policy on transparency, access to information, data protection, 
and strengthening oversight and effective accountability.63 
The creation of the SNT reinforces an open government model 
in which transparency is a key action in the anti-corruption strat-
egy.64 As is known, open access to public information for the press 
and the citizenship contributes to discovering corruption practices 
                                                                                                             
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pro-
ceso/docleg/62/223_DOF_27may15.pdf. 
 60 See generally Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información 
Pública [LGTAIP], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], May 4, 2015. 
 61 See Gobierno Federal, Reforma en Materia de Transparencia. Resumen 
Ejecutivo (Sept. 9, 2016), formato HTML, https://www.gob.mx/sfp/acciones-y-
programas/reforma-en-materia-de-transparencia-64474. 
 62 See LGTAIP, supra note 60, art. 30. 
 63 SISTEMA NACIONAL DE TRANSPARENCIA, formato HTML, 
http://www.snt.org.mx/ (consultada Sept. 9, 2018). 
 64 See Martín Cutberto Vera Martínez et al., El modelo de Gobierno Abierto 
en América Latina. Paralelismo de las políticas públicas de transparencia y la 
corrupción, in 53 ÍCONOS. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 85 (Pedro Salazar et. 
al. cords., 2017) (noting that access to public information is a democratic instru-
ment for combating corruption). 
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and produces a deterrent effect.65 In addition, the start-up of the Na-
tional Transparency Platform (Plataforma Nacional de Transparen-
cia)66 links the transparency policies with the e-government 
model.67 
The 2015 constitutional reform laid the foundations of the SNA, 
whose legal framework was developed by the seven secondary laws 
enacted in 2016, four of which were new laws68 and three of which 
were amendments to already existing laws.69 The system was cre-
ated to coordinate efforts of federal and local authorities in charge 
of administration control, oversight and auditing, and detection and 
sanctioning of acts of corruption. The SNA’s main task will be the 
design and putting public policies into practices in these matters.70 
Other agents, in addition to the government, pushed for the cre-
ation of the SNA. On the one hand, civil society supported the pro-
ject of an independent anti-corruption agency with citizen mem-
bers.71 Since Vicente Fox’s term, the involvement of civil society in 
                                                                                                             
 65 See Ximena Puente de la Mora, La transparencia y el acceso a la infor-
mación como herramientas contra la corrupción, CÓMO COMBATIR LA 
CORRUPCIÓN, 107 (2017). 
 66 PLATAFORMA NACIONAL DE TRANSPARENCIA, formato HTML, 
https://www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx/ (consultada July 10, 2018). 
 67 See generally Laura Sour Vargas, Gobierno electrónico y corrupción en 
México (2005-2010), 27 REVISTA INNOVAR 123 (2017) (stating that e-government 
promotes transparency in relations between public officials and citizens and re-
duces the chances of committing corruption acts). 
 68 See generally Ley General del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción 
[LGSNA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley General de 
Responsabilidades Administrativas [LGRA], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administra-
tiva [LOTFJA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley de 
Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas de la Federación [LFRCF], Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016. 
 69 See Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal [LOAPF], as 
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], Dec. 29, 1976; Ley Orgánica de 
la Procuraduría General de la República [LOPGR], Diario Oficial de la Feder-
ación [DOF], May 29, 2009; Código Penal Federal [CPF], Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF], Aug. 14, 1934. 
 70 See SISTEMA NACIONAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN, formato HTML, 
http://sna.org.mx/ (consultada July 10, 2018). 
 71 See Marván Laborde, supra note 58. 
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the fight against corruption commenced to grow.72 This process was 
fueled by the idea that civil society is uncontaminated,73 unlike pol-
iticians. Therefore, it can achieve better results in government con-
trol.74 In recent years, non-governmental organizations and scholars 
have asked in public forums about the “citizenisation” (ciudadan-
ización)75 of anti-corruption institutions. Citizen pressure finally led 
to the incorporation of the Citizen Participation Committee within 
the SNA. This Committee will be a permanent link between the new 
agency and civil society. 
On the other hand, international actors’ advice was a relevant 
factor in the SNA’s origin. To a large extent, the legal reforms and 
structural changes to combat corruption complied with global mar-
ket guidelines76 by the book.77 In the last few decades, world insti-
tutions like the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-
                                                                                                             
 72 See Morris, supra note 3, at 678 (noting the unique situation of “growing 
involvement and empowering of civil society in the fight” against corruption that 
took place at the beginning of the century). 
 73 See Morris, supra note 45, at 334 (stating that in Mexico there is a “pro-
society bias” and a sense that “civil society [is] not contaminated” because citi-
zens are “purer” than politicians). 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id.; see also Puente de la Mora, supra note 65, at 113. 
 76 See Barry Hindess, Introduction: How should we think about corruption?, 
CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS 1 (2012) (stating that in the dominant con-
temporary discussion, “corruption is primarily an economic issue, both in its con-
tent [ . . . ] and in its most important effects”). This is an “economistic, market-
based view of corruption” promoted by scholars like Susan Rose-Ackerman, who 
associates corruption with “dysfunctional public and private institutions” and sug-
gests as remedy “major institutional reforms of the kind promoted by the ‘good 
governance’ programs of the World Bank and other international agencies.” Id.; 
see also Barry Hindess, Good Government and Corruption, CORRUPTION AND 
ANTI-CORRUPTION 1 (2012) (stating that corruption is “a predominantly eco-
nomic issue” in “the modern understanding” that can be exemplified by Susan 
Rose-Ackerman’s account, whose ideas have been accepted by international fi-
nancial institutions and many aid agencies). 
 77 See Rose-Ackerman & Truex, supra note 4 (explaining that Mexico has 
adopted many provisions tending to “good governance,” including “improving 
top-down monitoring and punishment, fostering transparency and citizen involve-
ment [ . . . ] improving the competitiveness of government asset sales and large 
purchases, and privatizing certain government services”). 
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Operation and Development (hereinafter OECD) have strongly rec-
ommended the creation of Anti-Corruption Agencies.78 In the case 
of Mexico, the signing of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (hereinafter IACAC)79 and of the United Nations Con-
vention against Corruption (hereinafter UNCAC)80 compelled the 
Mexican State to “create, maintain and strengthen”81 an “[o]versight 
[body for] preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt 
acts”82 that shall be granted with “the necessary independence”83 
and provided with “[t]he necessary material resources and special-
ized staff.”84 
At first, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría Gen-
eral de la República, hereinafter PGR), with mandate for investigat-
ing and prosecuting corruption-related crimes in federal matters, as-
sumed the role of competent Anti-Corruption Authority.85 However, 
the PGR, hierarchically dependent upon the president, lacked the 
specialization and independence required by international stand-
ards.86 Along with the PGR, the Inter-Secretarial Commission for 
                                                                                                             
 78 See Luis de Sousa, Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and 
Irrelevance, RSCAS 2008/09 European University Institute Working Paper , 1 
(2009) (stating that “the Bretton Woods financial institutions, international donor 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International” 
expected the creation of Anti-Corruption Agencies as a part of a response against 
corruption from transition and developing countries). Particularly, “[t]he OECD 
was probably a pioneer in suggesting the creation of this type of independent and 
specialized units to member states as an integral part of their ‘ethics infrastruc-
tures.’” Id. 
 79 Signed by Mexico on March 29, 1996. Ratified by the Senate of the Re-
public on October 30, 1996. 
 80 Signed by Mexico on December 9, 2003. Ratified by the Senate of the Re-
public on April 29, 2004. 
 81 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. III, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter IACAC]. 
 82 Id. art. III. at 9. 
 83 United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 6.2, 43 I.L.M. 37 [here-
inafter UNCAC]. 
 84 Id.; see also id. art 36. 
 85 ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES, formato HTML, https://www.acauthori-
ties.org/country/mx (consultada Sept. 10, 2018). 
 86 See Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of models, 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1 (2008) 
(stating that the criteria for effective specialized anti-corruption bodies required 
by the UNCAC includes independence, specialization, adequate training, and re-
sources). 
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Transparency and Combat of Corruption in the Public Federal Ad-
ministration (Comisión Intersecretarial para la Transparencia y el 
Combate a la Corrupción en la Administración Pública Federal), 
created by Vicente Fox, was the first agency in charge of coordinat-
ing anti-corruption efforts across federal government bodies.87 
However, this Commission lacked administrative and financial in-
dependence too. 
The SNA follows the model of a “multi-purpose”88 agency with 
faculties of prevention, investigation, repression of corruption, and 
policy design and evaluation.89 On paper, Mexico’s SNA has some 
similarities with the Hong Kong’s agency,90 which is considered one 
of the most successful examples of an anti-corruption institution in 
the world.91 
B. Central Committees 
Three committees integrate the SNA: the Coordinating Commit-
tee, the Citizen Participation Committee, and the Steering Commit-
tee of the National Oversight System (Sistema Nacional de Fiscal-
ización, hereinafter SNF). The Executive Secretariat, which is a 
technical body, also integrates the SNA jointly with the 32 local 
anti-corruption systems that attend through representatives.92 
Five Federal institutions converge on the SNA: the ASF, the 
Public Function Secretariat of the Federal Executive (Secretaría de 
la Función Pública, hereinafter SFP), the Office of the Prosecutor 
                                                                                                             
 87 See Acuerdo por el que se crea la Comisión para la Transparencia y el 
Combate a la Corrupción en la Administración Pública Federal, como una 
comisión intersecretarial de carácter permanente, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF], Dec. 4, 2000, últimas reformas DOF Dec. 19, 2011 (Mex.). 
 88 Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of models, supra note 86, 
at 11. 
 89 Id. (stating that a “multi-purpose” agency is based “on key pillars of re-
pression and prevention of corruption: policy, analysis and technical assistance in 
prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, investigation”). 
 90 See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 569 (stating that “Mexico’s 
Anti-Corruption Commission comes close to the Hong Kong model, in that it 
would include investigative, prosecutorial, and awareness-raising powers (El Uni-
versal, 2013)”). 
 91 CASAR, supra note 4, at 47 (stating that the best examples of this model are 
the Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s agencies). 
 92 See LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 7. 
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Specialized in Combating Corruption of the PGR (Fiscalía Espe-
cializada en Combate a la Corrupción de la PGR, hereinafter 
FECC), the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (Tribunal Fed-
eral de Justicia Administrativa, hereinafter TFJA), and the INAI. 
These five institutions’ heads, together with a representative of the 
Citizen Participation Committee and a representative of the Council 
of the Federal Judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal), shape 
the Coordinating Committee.93 
The SNA has the mission of “coordinating the fight against cor-
ruption among local and federal authorities [as well as] designing 
and implementing the anti-corruption policy.”94 The Coordinating 
Committee, SNA’s head, is the system’s “fundamental piece”95 that 
seeks to overcome defects of previous institutional projects, such as 
“fragmentation in policies”96 and “implementation gaps”97 because 
of lack of coordination. In addition to its main coordination func-
tions, the Committee has power to issue non-binding public recom-
mendations on the adoption of measures for preventing acts of cor-
ruption and improving internal control bodies’ performance.98 It 
also has authority to participate in the international cooperation 
mechanisms related to conventions.99 
The Citizen Participation Committee is composed of five citi-
zens with “probity and prestige,”100 who “have stood out for their 
contribution to transparency, accountability or fight against corrup-
tion.”101 The Committee’s purpose is to contribute to fulfillment of 
                                                                                                             
 93 See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 
113, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], Feb. 5, 1917, últimas reformas DOF 
Feb. 10, 2014 (Mex.). 
 94 SISTEMA NACIONAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN, supra note 70. 
 95 Miguel Ángel Gutiérrez Salazar, La Auditoría Superior de la Federación 
y la conformación del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, 37 CUESTIONES 
CONSTITUCIONALES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 51, 56 
(2017). 
 96 OECD Integrity Review of Mexico: Taking A Stronger Stance Against Cor-
ruption, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 13 
(2017). 
 97 Id. 
 98 LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 9.IX. 
 99 See id. art. 9.XVII. 
 100 Id. art. 16. 
 101 CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 113.II. 
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SNA’s objectives by being a link with social and scholar organiza-
tions.102 Among other functions, the Committee can give opinions 
on the design of policies,103 propose projects,104 and build a citizen 
participation network based on a voluntary registry of civil society 
organizations.105 Citizen Committee’s president, as a representative 
before the Coordinating Committee, also chairs the SNA.106 
The SFP and the ASF, together with the federal states’, audit 
bodies and the local secretariats responsible for administrative inter-
nal control form the SNF.107 The SNF’s purpose is to establish ac-
tions and coordination mechanisms in the matters of internal control, 
oversight, and auditing of public funds.108 The two federal agencies’ 
holders, along with seven rotating members of the local bodies, 
shape the SNF’s Steering Committee.109 
The SNA’s Executive Secretariat has the nature of a decentral-
ized organism with its own assets and technical and management 
autonomy.110 It provides technical support and assistance as well as 
the necessary inputs for the functioning of the Coordinating Com-
mittee.111 This body will have the fundamental task of warranting 
the availability of resources and financial viability of the Commit-
tee. The annual Expenditure Budget will allocate the public funds 
for this body and for the whole SNA.112 
While central committees perform the coordinating and plan-
ning desk job, the field job is carried out by the various institutions 
                                                                                                             
 102 LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 15. 
 103 Id. art. 21.VI. 
 104 Id. art. 21.VII. 
 105 Id. art. 21.IX. 
 106 LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 10.I. 
 107 Id. art. 37. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. art. 39. 
 110 Id. art. 24. 
 111 LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 25. 
 112 See id. art. 25.II. (explaining that in 2018, the federal institutions member 
of the SNA received jointly Mexican pesos 3,981 million (around USD 205 mil-
lion)). The 56% went to the ASF. Id. The 4% (almost USD 9 million) went to the 
Executive Secretariat and central committees. Id.; see also Presupuesto de 
Egresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2018, Diario Oficial de la Fed-
eración [DOF] Nov. 19, 2017 (Mex.). 
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that converge in the SNA. Each of these bodies performs tasks re-
lated to control of public officials, audit of public funds, and deter-
mination of responsibilities and punishment of illegal acts. 
C. Internal Control Bodies 
The SFP commands the internal control of the administration. 
The SFP is a non-autonomous organ, part of the federal centralized 
administration, and is dependent on the Executive. Its holder is des-
ignated by the president and ratified by the Senate.113 The SFP per-
forms internal control tasks by itself by carrying out the expenditure 
inspection and evaluation of administrative management or through 
the internal control bodies of each of the federal departments and 
agencies, which it coordinates.114 The SFP issues the rules of inter-
nal control115 and audit procedures,116 as well as the mechanisms for 
the prevention of unlawful acts and the surveillance of public offi-
cials.117 Both the SFP and the internal control bodies of the different 
agencies oversee the planning and implementation of general mech-
anisms for the prevention of acts of corruption.118 
The SFP also fights corruption through keeping track of public 
servants’ declarations of assets and interests.119 It creates and over-
sees the general policies on public procurement120 and issues the 
Code of Ethics and Rules of Integrity for the exercise of public func-
tions.121 Likewise, it has authority for investigating and sanctioning 
non-serious administrative misdemeanors.122 
D. Audit Bodies 
Oversight tasks are carried out by the SFP in conjunction with 
the ASF. The SFP is responsible for auditing and monitoring the 
                                                                                                             
 113 See LOAPF, supra note 69, art. 37. 
 114 See id. art. 37.I. 
 115 See id. art. 37.II. 
 116 See id. art. 37.IV. 
 117 See id. art. 37.XIX. 
 118 See LGRA, supra note 68, art. 15. 
 119 See LOAPF, supra note 69, art. 37.XVI. 
 120 See id. art. 37.XXI. 
 121 See id. art. 37.XXVIII. 
 122 See id. art. 37.XVIII. 
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expenditure of federal funds from within as part of the federal ad-
ministration’s internal control bodies functions.123 The ASF per-
forms an external control over all government bodies. Both control 
procedures are independent and autonomous.124 
Unlike the SFP, the ASF is autonomous. The ASF belongs to the 
Chamber of Deputies to the Congress of the Union, but it regulates 
as a technical oversight organism125 with management126 and tech-
nical127 autonomy. The ASF oversees the State’s treasury use in all 
State areas: the three Powers of the Union, the autonomous consti-
tutional bodies, and the state governments and municipalities.128 
Likewise, it may audit any individual or private entity that collects, 
manages, or expends federal funds.129 
The ASF audits the public account after the financial year 
ends,130 in accordance with the principle of annuity. However, in 
special cases, when well-founded complaints are filed, the ASF may 
carry out reviews during the current financial year for the current or 
previous annual periods.131 Among the institutions that form the 
SNA, the ASF is recognized as the most effective because of its 
transparent and objective outcomes in the past.132 In this idea, the 
ASF constitutes as the SNA’s “substantive pillar”133 in oversight 
matters. 
E. Administrative Responsibilities Subsystem 
The SNA’s other central axis is the new public officials’ respon-
sibilities regime. These reforms have strengthened the two areas of 
                                                                                                             
 123 See id. art. 37.XXIV. 
 124 See LFRCF, supra note 68, art. 6. 
 125 See id. art. 4.I; see also CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 74.II, 79. 
 126 Management autonomy refers to the decisions on the internal organization, 
structure and functioning, as well as the administration of its human, material and 
financial resources. See LFRCF, supra note 68, art. 4.III. 
 127 Technical autonomy consists in the power to decide on the planning, pro-
gramming, execution, reporting, and monitoring of the audit process. See id. art. 
4.IV. 
 128 Id. art. 4.XI. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. art. 6. 
 131 See id. arts. 59–66; see also CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 79.I. 
 132 See Gutiérrez Salazar, supra note 95, at 52. 
 133 Id. at 53. 
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responsibility for lack of integrity and acts of corruption: adminis-
trative and criminal.134 
The administrative liability procedure begins when an irregular-
ity that may constitute an administrative misdemeanor is detected 
by the control and oversight bodies. An investigation may also begin 
when a complaint is filed.135 According to the new rules established 
in 2016, administrative misdemeanors are classified into two clas-
ses: non-serious and serious. Non-serious infringements consist of 
service duty breaches committed by public officials.136 These non-
serious infringements are substantiated and if necessary, sanctioned 
by the authorities in charge of internal control (the SFP) and external 
control (the ASF). Serious misdemeanors are acts of corruption 
comparable to criminal offenses (such as bribery, embezzlement, 
treasury diversion, information misuse, action under conflict of in-
terest, and trading in influence).137 These serious misdemeanors will 
be substantiated and sanctioned by the TFJA, an independent juris-
dictional body.138 
A big innovation is that the TFJA may also punish private agents 
for acts linked to serious administrative misdemeanors. These sanc-
tions will be independent of other types of responsibilities, such as 
criminal ones. In addition to economic punishments, disqualifica-
tion to participate in services or public works hiring may be imposed 
as well as compensation for damages.139 The legal entities may also 
be sanctioned with an activities suspension or even dissolution. To 
do that, the acts related to serious administrative infringements must 
be done by individuals acting on behalf of the legal entity and for its 
                                                                                                             
 134 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 14, at 96 (stating that the SNA has as one of its objectives: “strength-
ening enforcement mechanisms for investigating and sanctioning integrity 
breaches by public officials and firms under both administrative and criminal ju-
risdictions”). 
 135 See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 90–99. 
 136 See id. art. 49. 
 137 See id. arts. 51–64. 
 138 See LOTFJA, supra note 68, arts. 1, 4. 
 139 See id. art. 20.XI. 
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benefit.140 This is a great first step in the fight against corruption in 
the private sector.141 
As a part of SNA’s reforms, a third section was created within 
the TFJA’s Superior Chamber in addition to five Specialized Cham-
bers in the matter of Administrative Responsibilities.142 These bod-
ies will have exclusive competence to resolve and sanction admin-
istrative misdemeanors related to corruption. Until September 2018, 
because of the lack of political agreements, the appointments of 
these magistrates have not been ratified, which means that this 
SNA’s branch has not started to work.143 
F. Criminal Responsibilities Subsystem 
When the control and oversight bodies in exercise of their fac-
ulties identify acts of corruption that may be criminal offenses, they 
should submit the corresponding denouncement to the FECC.144 The 
FECC is a body with technical and operational autonomy, which is 
responsible for investigating the acts that the law considers criminal 
offenses of corruption on the federal level. The prosecutor will be 
responsible for presenting charges before the judicial authority 
where appropriate.145 So, the explicit146 powers (i.e. the fight against 
corruption) of this new law enforcement body refer to criminal of-
fenses established in the Tenth Title of the Federal Penal Code.147 
                                                                                                             
 140 See id. art. 20.XII. 
 141 See Francisco Ibarra Palafox, Corrupción y poderes privados, in CÓMO 
COMBATIR LA CORRUPCIÓN 187 (Pedro Salazar et al. coords., 2017). 
 142 See LOTFJA, supra note 68, arts. 20, 37–39. 
 143 See Luis Pérez de Acha y Denise Tron Zuccher, ¿Y los magistrados anti-
corrupción?, EL MUNDO DEL ABOGADO (Aug. 31, 2018), https://elmundodelabo-
gado.com/revista/item/y-los-magistrados-anticorrupcion (referring to the fact that 
in April 2017, President Enrique Peña Nieto appointed the 18 anti-corruption 
magistrates). According to the law, the appointment had to be ratified by the Sen-
ate, which never happened. Id. As a result, in September 2018, the system of ad-
ministrative responsibilities is not integrated yet. Id. 
 144 See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 10–11. 
 145 See LOPGR, supra note 69, art. 10 Bis. 
 146 Alberto Herrera Pérez, Fiscalía Especializada en Combate a la Corrup-
ción (breves comentarios jurídicos a su creación), 34 CUESTIONES 
CONSTITUCIONALES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 225, 
227 (2016). 
 147 Before the 2016 reform, these offenses were called “crimes committed by 
public officials.” Currently the offenses are the following: illicit exercise of public 
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The FECC was created in 2014148 after a constitutional political 
reform that changed the PGR’s organic framework. This constitu-
tional reform granted the PGR the nature of an autonomous body.149 
The promulgation of a new Organic Law and the appointment of a 
new Attorney General, which took place in December 2018, was 
necessary to finish the transformation process.150 The lack of politi-
cal consensus between political forces and the disagreement be-
tween various civil groups with the procedure envisaged151 have 
caused this delay of four years. 
These disagreements have impacted the start-up of the FECC. 
Since its creation in 2014, the body has had no holder because its 
initial appointment also has corresponded to the Senate. Thus, in the 
absence of a prosecutor, this SNA branch has not been put into full 
operation. 
                                                                                                             
service, abuse of authority, forced disappearance of person, coalition of public 
officials, illicit use of powers and faculties, extortion, intimidation, abuse of func-
tions, trading in influence, bribery, bribery of foreign public officials, embezzle-
ment, and illicit enrichment. See CPF, supra note 69, arts. 212–24. 
 148 See Acuerdo A/011/14 por el que se crea la Fiscalía Especializada en ma-
teria de Delitos relacionados con Hechos de Corrupción y se establecen sus 
atribuciones, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 03-12-2014 (Mex.). 
 149 The reform also changed the Attorney General’s Office’s name: instead of 
“Procuraduría” it becomes “Fiscalía”. See Decreto por el que se reforman, adi-
cionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, en materia política-electoral, art. 102.A, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 02-10-2014 (Mex.). 
 150 The entry into force of these reforms was conditioned on the issuance of 
secondary rules, after which an “express declaration” by the Congress of the 
“coming into force of the constitutional autonomy of the Republic Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office” should be done. See id. art. Sixteenth Transitory. 
 151 The 2014 reform provides that the Attorney General in office (appointed 
by the president) at the time which Congress issues the autonomy declaration will 
keep as a holder of the new office and will last nine years in chair. This is the 
central point of the debate because several civil society organizations claim that 
this procedure will not guarantee the independence of the Attorney. See Arturo 
Angel, ¿Cómo elegir al fiscal general? Lo que quiere AMLO vs. la propuesta de 
#FiscalíaQueSirva, ANIMAL POLÍTICO (July 10, 2018), https://www.animalpolit-
ico.com/2018/07/fiscal-general-amlo-propuesta/. 
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G. Local Anti-Corruption Systems 
Finally, the coordination between the 32 federal states and the 
Federation is another part of SNA’s axis. According to the constitu-
tional model, federal entities must create local anti-corruption sys-
tems that should replicate the federal system’s structure and institu-
tions, which are central committees; control and oversight bodies; 
prosecutor’s office; and specialized courts with jurisdiction for im-
posing sanctions on individuals and private companies.152 
Local systems’ representatives will join the SNA, completing 
the complex model. This means that states must also harmonize their 
legislation with the federal sphere by enacting these seven laws at 
the local level. Likewise, they must proceed with the integration of 
the instances and the appointment of the bodies’ holders. Until Sep-
tember 2018, twenty-one states have completed and implemented 
the legislative’s harmonization. However, only sixteen states have 
fully established the whole system.153 
IV. NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM’S IMMEDIATE 
FUTURE 
A. New Government: New Legal Reforms? 
Corruption was one of the main issues during the 2018 electoral 
process. Mutual accusations of acts of corruption dominated the 
presidential campaign, instead of public policies and proposals. Fi-
nally, the PRI’s defeat was associated with the great corruption 
scandals unleashed during Peña Nieto’s term,154 in which the same 
president was involved. 
The winning candidate made the fight against corruption one of 
his main flagship issues. In his rhetoric speeches, López Obrador 
                                                                                                             
 152 See CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 113. 
 153 See Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, Seguimiento. Sistemas Locales An-
ticorrupción de las Entidades Federativas (Sept. 17, 2018), formato PDF, 
http://sna.org.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Seguimiento_32SLA-17.09.2018-
Tablas.pdf. 
 154 See Sonia Corona, El PRI se derrumba tras las elecciones en México, EL 
PAÍS (July 3, 2018), formato HTML, https://elpais.com/internac-
ional/2018/07/02/mexico/1530556371_889535.html. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 109 
 
talked about an authentic “crusade” or a “social movement” to com-
bating corruption.155 However, among his proposals, he did not pre-
sent a clear position about the SNA’s future.156 The document, “50 
points to fight corruption,” which was made public after its triumph, 
indicates various measures of austerity, transparency, and control of 
public officials but does not mention the SNA.157 Regarding institu-
tional framework, this document only mentions the issue of the an-
ticorruption prosecutor’s autonomy.158 
After July 1st, this silence about the SNA provoked uncertainty. 
It is unclear whether the new government intends to continue the 
agency159 or plans to replace it with another institutional project. 
Considering the lack of continuity of public policies across presi-
dential periods that are usual in Mexico, the main fear is that López 
Obrador’s government will turn the rudder and abandon the SNA to 
make a fresh start. On the other hand, some “bad signals” after 
López Obrador’s triumph have also contributed to the uncertainty. 
For example, he has been tolerant with the incorporation into 
MORENA of politicians with records of corruption.160 Fronting 
López Obrador’s silence, the SNA’s Citizen Committee has deliv-
ered the results of a public consultation about the integration of the 
national anti-corruption policy that has been carried out in the last 
                                                                                                             
 155 See Alejandro Medina, La cruzada de AMLO contra la corrupción, 
FORBES (May 18, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/la-cru-
zada-de-amlo-contra-la-corrupcion/. 
 156 See Palmira Tapia, El Sistema Anticorrupción y el nuevo gobierno, FORBES 
(July 25, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/el-sistema-anticor-
rupcion-y-el-nuevo-gobierno/. 
 157 See Los 50 puntos del plan anticorrupción y de austeridad de AMLO, 
FORBES (July 15, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/estos-son-
los-50-puntos-del-plan-anticorrupcion-y-de-austeridad-de-amlo/. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Robert Clark, AMLO’s Election and the Future of Mexico’s National 
Anti-Corruption System, FCPAMÉRICAS (July 30, 2018), https://fcpameri-
cas.com/english/enforcement/amlos-election-futuremexicos-national-anti-cor-
ruption-system/. 
 160 See Leo Zuckerman, Las malas señales de AMLO en combate a la corrup-
ción, EXCÉLSIOR (July 10, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.excel-
sior.com.mx/opinion/leo-zuckermann/las-malas-senales-de-amlo-en-combate-a-
la-corrupcion/1251311. 
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months of 2018.161 This is a way to say – here we are, and we will 
continue working. 
As the inauguration approached, the picture begins to clear. Irma 
Eréndira Sandoval (López Obrador’s proposal for SFP’s head) has 
indicated that the SNA will be maintained, adjusting the designation 
processes of the SNA’s dependencies’ heads and incorporating the 
bodies in charge of electoral matters: National Electoral Institute 
(Instituto Nacional Electoral) and Office of the Prosecutor Special-
ized in Electoral Crimes (Fiscalía Especializada para la Atención 
de Delitos Electorales).162 Besides, the team in transition has not 
expressly proposed the creation of new institutions. 
Instead of starting from zero, the incoming government has a 
great opportunity to give continuity to the SNA. The new admin-
istration should recognize that it was an initiative supported by a 
coalition of civil society actors163 and not an exclusive idea of Peña 
Nieto’s group. López Obrador comes to power with enough political 
backup to promote the consensus required to complete the SNA’s 
starting-up in the critical areas of prosecution and punishment of 
corruption offenses. 
Additionally, the promulgation of new legislation mentions the 
specific matters of conflicts of interest, witnesses, and whistleblow-
ers protection.164 Senators of MORENA have already presented in-
                                                                                                             
 161 See Héctor Molina, Presentarán a AMLO propuesta de política anticor-
rupción a finales de año, EL ECONOMISTA (Aug. 29, 2018), formato HTML, 
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Presentaran-a-AMLO-propuesta-de-
politica-anticorrupcion-a-finales-de-ano-20180829-0048.html.; see also Sistema 
Nacional Anticorrupción, Propuesta de la Política Nacional Anticorrupción 
(Dec. 14, 2018), formato PDF, http://www.gob.mx/sesna/articulos/propuesta-de-
politica-nacional-anticorrupcion-185184. 
 162 See Ariadna Ortega, ¿Qué ‘ajustes’ quiere hacer el equipo de AMLO al 
SNA?, ADNPOLÍTICO (Oct. 3, 2018), https://adnpolitico.com/presiden-
cia/2018/10/03/que-ajustes-quiere-hacer-el-equipo-de-amlo-al-sna. 
 163 See Clark, supra note 159 (stating that López Obrador, recognizing the 
“value of continuity and stability[,] . . . can find a way to build on the work Mex-
ico’s civil society has performed in codifying the National Anti-Corruption Sys-
tem, instead of letting this potentially durable tool turn to rust”). 
 164 See Ortega, supra note 162. 
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itiatives before the Chamber of Senators to elevate the acts of cor-
ruption to the category of serious criminal offenses.165 As a conse-
quence, this measure would result in the preventive imprisonment 
of the accused during the prosecution. This proposal was formulated 
by López Obrador himself during his campaign.166 
In general, the adjustments are positively expected. Analysts 
acknowledge that, after two years of half operations, the SNA has 
not yielded visible results beyond showing that Mexico still lacks a 
national and articulated anti-corruption public policy.167 Conse-
quently, it is conveniently updating to an SNA “version 2.0”168 that 
consolidates the coordination and articulation of public policy. 
Firstly, the debate on whether maintaining the current specialized 
prosecutor appointment process or reforming it should be re-
solved.169 
For adjusting, it is necessary to have clarity about the SNA’s 
nature. The big innovation introduced by 2016 legal reforms was the 
SNA’s central coordination body, which was formed by the central 
committees. However, these reforms did not create new institutions 
for the tasks of control and oversight. These tasks belonged to insti-
tutions that already existed and performed their functions with 
greater or lesser effectiveness. In the case of the tasks of prosecution 
and sanction of responsibilities, the new specialized institutions are 
still not working, as it has been mentioned. 
In this way, the current lack of results in the prevention and pun-
ishment of acts of corruption should not be understood as a direct 
failure of the SNA’s coordination head, but rather, because of defi-
ciencies of the bodies that converge on the system. In this manner, 
                                                                                                             
 165 See Senado de la República, Elevar a delitos graves corrupción, robo de 
hidrocarburos, portación de armas y fraudes electorales, propone Ricardo Mon-




 166 See Trabaja el presidente electo de México, Andrés Manuel López Obra-
dor en dos paquetes de iniciativas de reformas (Aug. 10, 2018), formato HTML, 
https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/combate-a-la-corrupcion/. 
 167 See Eduardo Bohórquez, Por un Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción 2.0, 
LETRAS LIBRES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.letraslibres.com/mexico/revista/por-
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 169 See Angel, supra note 151. 
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the adjustments must begin from a diagnosis of each institution’s 
weaknesses to refine the necessary details for improving. The crea-
tion of new bureaucratic bodies should not be the option if it leads 
to the fragmentation of efforts.170 
On the other hand, linking the SNA with other administration 
bodies is proposed. For example, the Ministry of Education must 
promote integrity and ethics through educational policies.171 Like-
wise, the Ministry of Finance will provide the necessary resources 
for the system operation.172 As a coordination agency, SNA should 
direct and draw the route, but not work isolated from the rest of the 
State.173 Anti-corruption actions should be carried out in a transver-
sal way by many governmental actors. 
Politicians and administrators should have in mind that the es-
tablishment of the SNA is only the starting point of a long road. Its 
mere creation is not a guarantee of anything.174 There is a long list 
of anti-corruption institutions that have failed in both Mexico175 and 
in the world.176 Besides being provided with the necessary re-
sources, the SNA’s success depends on the government granting the 
                                                                                                             
 170 See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 578 (stating that in Mexico’s 
institutional reforms “[t]here is a fragmentation of efforts resulting in more bu-
reaucracy . . . [as] [e]ach project . . . is added on to the previous one, resulting in 
a patchwork system (instituciones ‘chipotle’)”). 
 171 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 96, at 35–36. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. (stating that “[a]nti-corruption is a cross-cutting issue that involves all 
of government”). “A typical failure of anti-corruption strategies is that implemen-
tation is assigned to a single anti-corruption body . . . without acknowledging that 
these bodies usually lack the authority to demand action from other public insti-
tutions.” Id. 
 174 See CASAR, supra note 4, at 53. 
 175 See Márquez, supra note 50, at 75, 92 (stating that the new mechanisms 
“will not eliminate corruption in the country because they replicate the same 
model established for reforming legal institutions”). The Mexican anticorruption 
model has a “dysfunctional nature”: “it has the laws and the institutions, but little 
or no effectiveness.” Id. 
 176 See de Sousa, supra note 78, at 1 (stating that Anti-Corruption Agencies 
“are often regarded by governments, donors and international governmental or-
ganizations . . . as the ultimate institutional response to corruption. Most [agen-
cies] have been set up in a context of systemic corruption and a considerable num-
ber of them have fallen short of the expectations raised”). 
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political backup required to directly confront the interests of the cor-
rupt groups entrenched in power. If the government does not show 
the will to challenge these factions, anti-corruption institutions’ mis-
sion will fail as soon as it meets the wall of those interests.177 
B. International Anti-Corruption Conventions Implementation 
Gaps 
Full compliance of recommendations derived from international 
conventions still is a pending issue to be addressed in the immediate 
future of anti-corruption institutions. In 2012, the country had only 
complied with the implementation of 23% of the measures con-
tained in the UNCAC or Merida’s Convention.178 The Report on 
compliance derived from the visit of the Intergovernmental Review 
Mechanism in 2013 recommended specific legislative adjustments, 
such as the harmonization of the criminal offenses provided in Mex-
ican legislation with the corruption conduct listed in the UNCAC.179 
The 2016 reforms met most of those recommendations for the 
federal level. However, some issues remain pending, such as the 
criminalization of transnational passive bribery,180 as well as the 
possibility of criminalizing bribery181 and embezzlement182 in the 
private sector. Similarly, the Mexican legislation on illicit enrich-
ment has some issues that should be removed, including the require-
ment of connection with the individual’s employment, which does 
not appear in the UNCAC.183 At the local level, the differences be-
tween the 32 penal codes of states and the Convention’s corruption 
                                                                                                             
 177 See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 578 (stating that “[a]lthough 
some [agencies] have been successful in fighting corruption, in most cases, they 
falter whenever they uncover the dirty linen of those in power (c.f. the Icarus Par-
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 178 See Edgardo Buscaglia, supra note 33, at 276. 
 179 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Informe sobre el examen 
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 180 See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 16. 
 181 See id. art. 21. 
 182 See id. art. 22. 
 183 See id. art. 20. 
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offenses are extensive. It is very important to move towards the ho-
mogenization of the states’ penal codes regarding corruption. 
In addition to the substantive adjustments, the UNCAC’s Re-
view Mechanism recommended several procedural changes, such as 
extending the protection of witnesses, whistleblowers, and their rel-
atives and close persons,184 which Mexican law provides for cases 
of serious offenses and organized crime, to cases regarding corrup-
tion offenses.185 The 2016 reforms addressed this issue by stating 
the possibility of anonymous complaints as well as identity protec-
tion measures for whistleblowers and witnesses in administrative li-
ability proceedings for acts of corruption.186 Likewise, since 2014, 
the criminal proceedings law contemplates protection measures for 
witnesses and whistleblowers in criminal proceedings.187 
However, these protections are not enough because Mexican law 
does not include clear safeguarding mechanisms post-intervention 
in the criminal process. For example, there are not legal protections 
in labor matters for cases in which the informant or witness suffer 
negative consequences, such as removal.188 The insufficient protec-
tion of whistleblowers and witnesses is also an aspect that has been 
highlighted by the Follow-up Mechanism on the implementation of 
IACAC, suggesting the adoption of a better regulation in the mat-
ter.189 
                                                                                                             
 184 See id. art. 32–33. 
 185 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 179, at 6. 
 186 See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 64, 91. 
 187 See Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales [National Code of Crim-
inal Proceedings], as amended, arts. 367, 370, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF], Mar. 5, 2014 (Mex.) [hereinafter CNPP]. 
 188 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 96, at 127 (stating that “[c]omprehensive whistleblower protection in-
cludes a number of mechanisms that seek to compensate whistleblowers experi-
encing reprisals in the workplace, such as dismissal, demotion or suspension; 
transfer or reassignment; or change in duties”). 
 189 See Organization of American States, Mechanism for Follow-Up on Imple-
mentation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption [MESISIC]. 
Mexico: Final Report, 77 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/me-
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Regarding the benefits for the participants in corruption offenses 
who later collaborate with the justice as witnesses or informants,190 
the Mexican procedural law contemplates some privileged treat-
ments, for example: the reduction of punishment, subject to the ad-
mission of responsibility in an abbreviated trial;191 or the exemption 
of judicial process by application of an opportunity criterion, which 
is subjected to the provision of information for the prosecution of a 
more serious crime.192 However, these general measures niether re-
fer specifically to corruption offenses nor do they reach the level of 
“judicial immunity” recommended by the UNCAC.193 
Mexico also has some pending adjustments related to the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in In-
ternational Business Transactions. The last implementation report of 
2014 pointed out several recommendations that still have not been 
attended, such as amendments in the legislation on liability of legal 
entities for foreign bribery (particularly in the case of companies 
owned and controlled by the State) and in the topics of sanctions and 
confiscation of property against legal entities.194 
In this context, the SNA’s Coordinating Committee should un-
dertake the task of reviewing compliance with the commitments es-
tablished in the treaties signed by Mexico and promoting those that 
remain unattended. Likewise, within the objectives of the anti-cor-
ruption policy, the SNA should promote in all levels of government 
a greater public officials’ knowledge on the treaties. The agreements 
should be understood as a “model law” that guides the normative 
construction of the national system.195 
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 190 See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 37. 
 191 See CNPP, supra note 187, arts. 201–02. 
 192 See id. art. 256.V. 
 193 See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 37.3. 
 194 See generally Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
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C. Required Cultural Shifts 
The sole creation of the SNA will not reduce corruption. The 
examples in the world show that anti-corruption agencies like the 
SNA are not the panacea.196 In addition, corruption is not only an 
economic phenomenon197 but multifactorial. To that extent, institu-
tional work should promote different strategies that include actions 
in the educational and cultural spheres. Policy should promote a new 
organizational culture within the government and companies, imple-
ment a culture of denouncement and punishment, and strengthen 
prevention by improving the effectiveness of sanctions. Corruption 
is the result of a combination of factors; so, its elimination requires 
a change of that combination.198 
As mentioned before, Mexico’s cultural situation facilitates cor-
ruption. In a vicious circle, culture appears both as a corruption’s 
cause and effect.199 Hence, as a priority, institutions must promote 
changes in the Mexican value systems by educational policies.200 
Besides new generations’ formation in schools, an authentic “social 
pedagogy”201 is required for educating the population in the “con-
science of corruption.”202 These cultural and educational policies 
must have an impact on social conventions so that people them-
selves will reject corrupt practices.203 
López Obrador’s government expectations are based on the gen-
eration of this new culture of values, which will extend to the ad-
ministration and government fields. López Obrador has insisted his 
government will not be only a political change but a “Fourth Social 
                                                                                                             
 196 See de Sousa, supra note 78, at 5. 
 197 See Hindess, supra note 76, at 11. 
 198 See Castañeda Rodríguez, supra note 48, at 131. 
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 200 See García González et al., supra note 16, at 255 (stating that the legal or 
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Transformation of Mexico”204 that will drive profound changes. Ac-
cording to him, this transformation will be based on a “republican 
austerity”205 policy that will eliminate the privileges and excesses of 
the political class and will allow Mexico to rebuild the confidence 
of the citizens in the rulers. For this cultural change, the president 
will be the first to set the example.206 
Beyond rhetoric, it is clear that a mandate will not eliminate the 
corruption. The beginning of cultural change requires specific ac-
tions, such as the spread of a public service culture based in moder-
ation, ethics, and responsibility. For cultivating this “culture of in-
tegrity”207 within public bodies, generalizing the adoption of codes 
of ethics and conduct has been recommended.208 These codes of eth-
ics and conduct in all government levels should follow the new 
guidelines established by the SNA. 
In 2002, the SFP issued a code of ethics, which established the 
principles that should govern the behavior of public servants, among 
others. The code of ethics called for the following: promotion of the 
common good, integrity, honesty, impartiality, justice, transpar-
ency, accountability, and generosity.209 A new code of ethics en-
acted in 2015 defines the constitutional principles of legality, hon-
esty, loyalty, impartiality, and efficiency.210 This code also refers to 
                                                                                                             
 204 See Declaración de Principios de Morena, https://lopezobra-
dor.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Declaracion-de-Principios-
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some values, such as public interest, respect for human rights, equal-
ity and non-discrimination, gender equity, integrity, transparency, 
and accountability.211 Also, it establishes integrity rules in twelve 
areas, including public behavior, public contracting, licensing, per-
missions, authorizations and concessions, internal control, and co-
operation with integrity.212 In this way, the 2015 extensive code of 
ethics includes a wide range of principles and values that make it 
complex. Due to the codes’ complexity, the streamlining of the doc-
ument and the elaboration of more comprehensive manuals or 
guides in plain language has been recommended.213 
Ethics policies must also target the organizational culture of the 
private sector. In Mexico today, as mentioned, corruption is not only 
a state issue but is also internalized within companies. The normal-
ization of corruption provokes a “slide effect”:214 own organiza-
tions’ practices lead individuals to fall into dishonest acts.215 In this 
way, companies and employers must be considered a central part of 
both the problem and the solution. The SNA should have powers to 
require them to establish integrity policies and make them public.216 
Therefore, the integration of private economy sector representa-
tives into the SNA is necessary. The participation of civil society 
organizations that occurred with the creation of the Citizens Com-
mittee in 2016 was a great step forward, but the move towards the 
business organizations, which also have responsibility in the issue 
and must coordinate efforts with the State, is pending.217 
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Besides the promotion of moral values of honesty and integrity 
as a part of a cultural shift, more pragmatic changes should be 
pushed for the prevention of corruption. Citizens should adopt a per-
manent watchdog attitude and normalize the reporting of corruption 
acts. Transparency policies, whistleblowers protection measures, 
and even the strengthening of free press218 and working rights219 are 
aspects that can encourage the generation of that denouncement cul-
ture. 
However, the denunciation is of little use if judicial processes 
fail, which it has up to now. An adequate criminal policy220 and 
strong judicial institutions are fundamental,221 but political will is 
crucial. Political will, reflected in the decision of impartially apply-
ing the law to all cases, is indispensable to have success on imposing 
sanctions.222 The application of the law should not wane to a random 
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or selective223 imposition of punishments. Law enforcement institu-
tions should proceed against all responsible parties for their acts of 
corruption, regardless of the political group to which they belong.224 
So far, anti-corruption policies and measures have failed in really 
facing powerful corrupt forces. As long as Mexican anti-corruption 
forces do not confront the abusive exercise of political power to 
tame it and impose limitations on it, they will continue to be a sim-
ulation.225 
Application of justice is fundamental to spread the idea that im-
punity will no longer be the rule. To the extent that these sanctions 
begin to occur, the deterrent effect of the sanctions will be generated, 
and more importantly, the citizens will regain confidence in the in-
stitutions.226 Ultimately, if this does not happen, and the government 
again fails to meet the expectation for change, as happened with Fox 
in 2000, it will be up to civil society to push towards change. The 
involvement of the citizens should keep growing as it has done up 
to now. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Corruption is one of many problems that López Obrador’s gov-
ernment will face, alongside the dramatic situation on issues of 
criminality and the violence crisis. To tackle corruption, incoming 
                                                                                                             
cut red tape to reduce the opportunities for corruption; and (5) enhance public 
trust in politicians and civil servants by curbing corruption.”). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Recently, Javier Duarte, former governor of the State of Veracruz, accused 
of multiple acts of corruption, was sentenced to nine years in prison. The sentence 
caused controversy as the punishment was considered insufficient. This condem-
nation of Duarte occurred in an abbreviated procedure, which allows the attenua-
tion of punishment in exchange for the accused’s admission of responsibility. See 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Tagle & Alejandro Hernández Oseguera, La sentencia de 
Javier Duarte. Un análisis legal, NEXOS (Oct. 1, 2018), formato HTML, 
https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=9034. 
 225 See Jaime Cárdenas, Causas de la corrupción y soluciones para enfren-
tarla, in CÓMO COMBATIR LA CORRUPCIÓN 223 (Pedro Salazar et al. coords., 2017) 
(“[A]nti-corruption laws constitute a simulation because the institutional scaffold-
ing that they create is controlled by the Executive’s head and by the three major 
parties. These laws do not face the power in Mexico that is the producer of cor-
ruption in the country.”). 
 226 See Quah, supra note 222. 
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government must define its tools and make a starting decision: 
whether to endorse or abandon the scaffolding of the SNA. López 
Obrador has already shown he can abandon without doubting pro-
jects associated with the previous government, whether institutional 
(as the educational reform and energetic reform) or even contracts 
for public works (as the new international airport). Thus, some 
weeks after his inauguration, the question remains in the air. 
In my opinion, the SNA should not be left out of the fourth trans-
formation. The creation of new institutions would be a bad idea be-
cause Mexico does not need new institutions for its same old prob-
lems. Adjusting the ones already existing and taking advantage of 
their experience even if it is minimal would be a better decision. 
Thus, the most reasonable option is to keep the SNA and refine it on 
the points that should be defined in the public debate in the coming 
days. Besides the aspects indicated on this paper, one of the main 
shortcomings of the SNA is its unnecessary complexity: so many 
coordinating committees and subsystems can decay into a new form 
of bureaucracy. Simplification of structures and clarification of 
functions will be useful. 
With or without the SNA, Lopez Obrador’s true challenge will 
be to bring institutions to life. To accomplish this, new govern-
ment’s intention is crucial. They must decide to act right now and 
show the public that tolerance is over. Let me end with this image: 
the fight against corruption could be seen as a car race. In Mexico 
we have not even left the grid. The SNA is the greatest car that we 
have ever had, but it remains stopped. It will hinge on López Obra-
dor’s administration whether the car remains stopped or finally 
starts its engine and moves towards the finish line. 
